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                                                                Abstract 
I investigate in this pepper the IMF approach to fulfill its mandate in LOWE INCOM COUNTRIES by 
focusing on the importance of fiscal rules as a strong tool that could impact the fiscal stance and 
long-term growth in Lowe income countries. I presented details about the fiscal rules and their 
design elements particularly in support of enforcement in low-income countries. I took the fiscal 
rules imposed by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA)  on CAMERON  
as a case of study . I found The fiscal rules in low-income countries are very important. they help to 
increase stability by reducing the procyclicality of the policy if it is well designed and also, The 
supranational rules have proven their efficiency for the economic unions and countries monetary 
union because they maintain a certain level of fiscal discipline but the stabilization policies and fiscal 
rules have not achieved much growth in the long term, at least for the past 10 years Growth rates 
although they achieved sustainable debt level   
Acronyms 
IMF The international monetary fund  
LIC The low income countries  
GDP The Growth Domestic Product 
SCF The Standby Credit Facility    
RCF The Rapid Credit Facility  
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EFF The  Extended Fund Facility  
 ECF The Extended Credit Facility  
 ESAF The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
PRS The  poverty reduction strategy PRS 
PRGF The  Poverty Reduction Facility 



















I chose this topic because of the importance of fiscal rules and their impact on the fiscal stance and 
long-term growth in Lowe income countries as one of the most recent tools of fiscal stabilization 
policy that the IMF encourages low-income countries to implement. 
Most low-income countries suffer from a lack of fiscal discipline, and this increases the public deficit 
in them, which leads to a significant increase in public debt and increases the debt service burdens, 
and enters the country into a debt crisis, so fiscal sustainability has become a source of worry in 
these countries. 
In order to solve this problem and make fiscal policy more sustainable, many low-income countries, 
encouraged by the International Monetary Fund, resorted to using fiscal rules. 
For these reasons, I will try to find an answer to this question: How far do stabilization policies and 
fiscal rules imposed by the IMF to Low-Income Countries affect public service delivery and 
investment rates which are key for long term Development? 
To response at this question, I will start with an introduction on the International Monetary Fund to 
know its role and its most important goals in low-income countries and its approach to achieving its 
goals, the most important of which is economic stability and growth by working to reform the 
distortions of these economies through structural adjustment policies. 
We will address the most important features that characterize the economies of low-income 
countries and the most important modified programs in order to help these countries and the history 
of their development and the most important improvements in the conditionality system through 
the introduction of national ownership of the anti-poverty strategy. We will also be exposed to the 
most important types of concessional loans that these countries can take advantage of to overcome 
external and internal shocks In order to reduce the effects of economic fluctuations on the poor in 
these countries 
We will be exposed to the most important analytical tools developed by the International Monetary 
Fund to guide macroeconomic policies in these countries such as controlling public debt and the 
fiscal rules applied to control the deficit in order to sustain debts and control spending to maintain 
the expenditures necessary for growth and for this reason I will be exposed to fiscal rules in much 
detail its definition and Their characteristics and gaps in each rule and the most favorable fiscal rules 
for low-income countries 
After all this, we will put the fiscal rules on the test to answer the fundamental question of this work, 
is whether the stabilization policies and fiscal rules can achieve economic stability and sustainable 
growth in the long run? 
To answer this question, we will present the experience of one low-income country with the fiscal 
rules, which is the country of Cameroon that has applied supranational fiscal rules imposed on it by 
the CAME Union since the year 2000 with analysis and discussion, and what has Cameroon achieved 
with these rules? 
Before the conclusion, I will present the most important benefits of the policies and programs of the 
International Monetary Fund to low-income countries and the most important criticisms of these 




1. The IMF role 
 
The International Monetary Fund was created to be a force for achieving stability in the global 
financial system, promoting global trade, macroeconomic stability and growth of  their member 
countries, while the World Bank is considered to be a development intuition  as it helps countries to 
reduce poverty by focusing on the structural and organizational dimensions, but after the debt crisis 
In the 1980s, there was a significant overlap in tasks between the IMF and the World Bank, although 
the division of labor was evident when the two institutions were established. 
For example, the primary role of the International Monetary Fund was to help countries overcome 
temporary imbalances in the balance of payments, but during the eighties and nineties it became 
playing a longer role by providing long-term loans to support strategies to fight poverty, achieve 
economic stability and increase growth. 
In the 1980s, the IMF focused on assisting developing countries and economies in transition through 
loans and credit assistance and by establishing structural adjustment facilities (SAFs) later developed 
into the ESAF and recently to the PRGF Poverty Reduction Facility. These facilities have included the 
International Monetary Fund within the scope of the traditional competence of the World Bank. 
To ensure macroeconomic stabilization in LIC The IMF provides financial resources to cover part of 
external deficit and budget deficit that may occur in case of structural fragility as well as in case of 
external and internal shocks… but only on the condition of approval of the policy that these countries 
need and helps them also to build their own capacities for Implement these policies 
Another goal of both IMF and World Bank programs is the mobilization of private capital flows 
otherwise known as catalysis although there is still doubt about the importance of this catalysis 
effect. 
But for the IMF there is also some evidence (Bulir and Hamann, 2001) “that staying on track with IMF 
programmers does sharply reduce the volatility and shortfalls of aid flows – though both still remain 
remarkably high even with Fund programmers. HIPC Ministerial Network (2002 and 2003) indicates 
that one factor explaining continued volatility and shortfalls is that some Fund staff give behind the-
scenes negative signals to donors about country commitment, while failing to explain the complex 
interaction of external shocks, programmer mis-design and poor implementation” ( Matthew Martin 
and Hannah Bargawi 2005). 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have used, since their creation, the 
conditionality tool to orientate policies member countries the fulfillment of these conditions is a 
necessary to benefit from their services with varying degrees of flexibility between the two 
institutions. 
The World Bank has more conditions than the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank 
considers the full fulfillment of the conditions of the International Monetary Fund is one of its basic 
conditions in dealing with low-income countries, It is known that the traditional conditionality 
inherent in most of the IMF and WB programs in low-income countries is to reduce the budget deficit 
by reducing government spending and devaluation the value of the national currency and limiting the 
domestic debt and structuring  the economy through the privatization of public companies and the 
liberalization of trade, prices and interest rates… 
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The IMF’s programs in the low-income countries faced a lot of criticism:  policies are described as 
arbitrary and anti-growth in low-income countries, in contrast to the World Bank approach that some 
describe as a softer policy  and more flexible in dealing with failure to fulfill conditions. 
 
2. IMF approach to fulfill its mandate in LICs 
 
In this part, we will get to know the most important goals of the International Monetary Fund in low-
income countries and the most important common characteristic of these countries we will also 
show in some detail the IMF conditionality system and the chronological development of the IMF 
programs and the most important financing facilities for the low-income countries. 
 
2.1 Main objectives pursued 
 
The main objective of the IMF is to ensure sustainable imbalances and long term growth.  The design 
of programs supported by the International Monetary Fund is based on an investigation Objectives 
set by the fund, i.e. structural policies that aim to achieve sustainable economic growth and poverty 
reduction To fix those objectives, the IMF uses financial models that work to manage public 
expenditures, revenues and debts that are compatible with sustainable growth . Fiscal rules are then 
discussed and applied in order to guide policy choices. 
 
2.2 Main characteristics of LICs in terms of macroeconomic risks 
 
Low-income countries suffer from difficulties indebts service due to the accumulation of large 
domestic and external arrears, which makes her always seeking   restructured their external debt , as 
most Lowe income countries were classified in the past as poor and heavily indebted countries and 
eligible for debt relief under the HIPC initiative and the Paris Club. 
As a result of weak economic structure and macroeconomic policy slippage, low-income countries, 
they are more vulnerable than other countries to the impact of external shocks.  they are particularly 
vulnerable to trade shocks as a result of their weak production base and their dependence on the 
export of raw materials. Limited access to financial markets. Irregular debt and irregular subsidies 
make difficult to cover growing current account deficit Therefore, they resort to borrowing from 
multiple parties, including the International Monetary Fund. 
The rise in food and fuel prices 2007 and 2008 has exacerbated the balance of payments conditions 
for these countries, and the recent  pandemic crisis has had a significant negative impact on the 
economies of these countries, as is the case with the Corona crisis that has paralyzed the global 
economy as a whole, indeed that low-income countries will be the largest affected, which means the 
need for low-income countries for the IMF’s funding has remained and remains vital and the 
evidence for this is the financial facilities that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has granted in 
recent months to low-income countries to help them cope with this pandemic and its negative 
effects on their weak economies. 
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Table1 .The economies characteristic of SUB SAHARAN COUNTRIES  since 2008. 
 
 
IMF WEB SIT Analytical Group Data 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2020/01/weodata/weoselagr.aspx 
 
GRAFIC1:  GDP growth ( Annual % ) for Low Income Countries 
 
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=XM 
 
1) Real growth rates of LICs  
Low-income countries witnessed a significant decline in development rates after 2008 due to the 
financial crisis that negatively affected the economies of donor countries and international loan 
institutions and also because of the fuel crisis in 2008 all this made the growth rate decrease in the 
LIC until it reached 2.3% in 2012 to  increase again and the growth  continue to rise until  reaches 
5.6% in the year 2013 to enter a new continuous decline to reach its lowest level of 2% in the year 
2015  then it enters into a continuous decline due to the crisis of the decline in the prices of raw 
materials that are the basis of exports in low-income countries and after that the LIC  keep the 
growth rate low between 3,5 and 4,5 
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Low growth greatly affected per capita income in low-income countries. According to the World Bank 
director in Africa2018, 12 sub saharien countries with 400 million people are at risk of declining per 
capita income, meaning that low-income countries are still fragile, unstable, and far from achieving 
sustainable development even though they have seen Significant development rates between 2008 
and 2015, but after that, their development rates were very low 
2) Evolution of Debt levels (in % of GDP) and debt services  
Debt and debt benefits represent the biggest challenge facing low-income countries, where they 
have increased in recent years by very large proportions. Here, I will rely on more accurate data for 
sub-Saharan countries that include 6 low-income countries.  
The debt in sub-Saharan countries increased from 34% of GDP in 2013 according to the IMF to Over 
48% of GDP in 2016 and debt accumulation was greater in oil exporting countries, where public debt 
increased by 8% of GDP annually between 2013 and 2016, and this may  explain by the fluctuations 
of oil prices and and the failure of fiscal policies to avoid these effects of oil price fluctuations by 
using some fiscal rules that can reduce the magnitude of this damage(IMF WEBSITE)  also  Oil 
revenues always encourage excessive spending due to expectations of large returns 
As for the rest of the countries, the debt was increasing 5% of the GDP annually. The main factors 
behind this significant increase in debt levels in general are the budget deficit and the evaluation 
effects related to the exchange rate and the losses of state companies 
As a result of this rapid accumulation of debt, the average debt service to revenues in sub-Saharan 
countries increased from 5% in 2013 to a huge figure of 25%, , according to the director of the Africa 
branch of the International Monetary Fund 2018. 
These debts are undoubtedly becoming a major impediment to the development of these countries 
and It introduced this countries in a vicious cycle of borrowing to pay off only a portion of the debt 
interest. 
3) Evolution of public revenues and public expenditures (in % of GDP)  
The government revenues ,in  low-income countries and sub-Saharan countries in general have 
remained unable to reduce levels of the budget deficit, and this is due to several reasons, including 
weak revenues due to insufficient resource mobilization policies in these countries due to the 
weakness of the tax system as a result of the inefficiency of management and  the spread of bribery 
And patronage. 
The other side is the aspect of expenditures. These countries still have a very large need for 
development. Therefore, they have to spend in excess as a result of their need for infrastructure and 
social spending on health and education in order to form future generations. 
Inefficiency of government projects also is one of the most important methods of lost government 
spending, especially since bribery and accounting fraud are common in these countries as a result of 
weak administration and civil society organizations. 
The accumulated public debt service also absorbs a large percentage of government revenue and 
crowds out spending necessary for development. For example, Zambia’s spending on debt service 
exceeds half of what it spends on health and education in 2011. 
4) Evolution of external current account (in % of GDP) 
Balance of the current balance account for sub-Saharan countries, it remained negative during the 
past ten years, due to several reasons. 
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Firstly, most of these countries ’exports  raw materials, and they import almost everything because 
of the lack of development of the industrial sector in these countries and their failure to add value to 
these materials in order to achieve a portion of self-sufficiency and export their raw materials at a 
more expensive price. 
Secondly, these countries import a lot of capital goods for industry and infrastructure. 
Thirdly, fluctuations in the prices of raw materials in global markets, and the fact that these countries 
are not the ones who determine the price, but are merely price taker according to international 
supply and demand for these commodities. 
Fourth: The injustice of the international trade system and the strength of competition in global 
markets. 
 
2.3 IMF programs and tools specifically adapted to LICs and their evolution 
 
The International Monetary Fund has endeavored to support developing countries, especially low-
income countries, through structural reforms that achieve macroeconomic stability through lending 
facilities to correct imbalances in the balance of payments and budget deficits and to maintain debt 
stability and help them absorb external trade shocks And that is through a simple conditionality 
system and improved programs that take into account the specificity of these countries. Here, we 
will be exposed to the conditionality system of the International Monetary Fund and the most 
important improvements that occurred on the Fund's programs during the past twenty years. 
Conditionality is one of the elements in a broad strategy to help countries design and implement 
strong financial policies conditionality is the linking of financing by the International Monetary Fund 
to programs that the Fund deems appropriate to correct imbalances in the country's economic 
structure. 
The International Monetary Fund has paid attention to the permanent improvement of the principles 
of conditionality through many of the principles necessary for successful design and implementation 
of programs supported by the Fund and the most important of these principles is the principle of 
National ownership. 
National ownership is the responsibility of officials in the country to formulate and implement 
programs through a negotiating process between the fund and officials in the country so that officials 
in the country feel that the programs are theirs and are for them but with the advice and follow-up 
of IMF officials The essence of national ownership is that IMF officials take into account the country's 
socio-economic conditions and the country's ability to implement reforms within the agreed time 
frame, especially in low-income countries where administrative capacity is very weak IMF provides 
technical advice to make sound decisions.  
Conditionalities, when they are well-designed and amicably between the authorities in the country 
and the fund, can reinforce and strengthen national ownership. For this reason, the Fund has carried 
out numerous reviews of conditionality and its programs during the past twenty years because 
conditionality must go hand in hand with national ownership for the design and successful 
implementation of the supported programs by the IMF. 
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The relationship between national ownership and Conditionality is a complex and interactive 
relationship, while strong conditionality cannot compensate for weak national ownership, and 
therefore national ownership and conditionality are complementary. 
In the 1980s, the IMF policewoman focused on macroeconomic policies, but with the increase in 
structural complexities in low-income countries that impeded growth and stability in these countries 
and as a result of the fluctuating global conditions that complicated the implementation of the 
reform programs and conditions imposed by the IMF on low-income countries, the Fund made 
several reviews on Its programs to increase the likelihood of program success and reduce risk.  
 
The most important reviews for the IMF programs 
 
1) Review 2000/1999 
Conditionality was developing over time in the IMF, so an EFF established in 1974 an expanded fund 
to address serious imbalances in the balance of payments as well as establishing the SAF Structural 
Adjustment Facility and after IMF establishing the ESAF in the 1980s after it became involved with 
low-income countries and the explicit purpose of these facilities was It is to reduce the severe 
structural imbalances in the LIC that suffer from low growth rates and low per capita income. 
However, these programs did not give the expected results, but rather they exacerbated the 
economic and social situation in low-income countries and accused the International Monetary Fund 
that it exceeded the limits of its powers by using its financial influence to dictate policies in its favor. 
It was also questioned that these programs did not take into account the ability of Local authorities 
to implement them and their capacity mobilize political support for them, which raised suspicions 
about the unreality of the design of these programs and their suitability to the conditions of these 
countries. 
Therefore, critics demanded the IMF policies to simplify the conditionality system and give national 
ownership a greater role in programs and a more efficient division of programs. To correct these 
gaps, the IMF revised the conditionality system in the year 2000 by introducing the National 
ownership for poverty reduction strategy PRS through the PRGF Poverty Reduction Facility 
established in 1999 to succeed the ESAF facility in order to be an effective concessional lending tool 
that responds to LIC requirements. That is why the design of this facility should take into account the 
nature of LIC economies, their needs for growth for the benefit of the poor, while the IMF 
acknowledging the relationship between macroeconomic policies, growth and poverty reduction 
policies.  
 As a result of these reforms in the context of Poverty Reduction Facility-supported programs, they 
have raised spending on health and education on the assumption that they have a significant impact 
on economic growth, and capital spending such as vital infrastructure and economic governance has 
increased to boost growth (the IMF role in LIC /Domenico Lombardi 2005). 
 
2) 2010/2009 Reviews 
For the improvements in conditionality in the Fund's programs for the LIC in 2010, it was the result of 
the pressures resulting from the 2008 financial and economic crises and the fuel price shocks of 
2008, which caused the LIC's demand for IMF funds to increase significantly and unprecedentedly. 
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Here, the IMF is satisfied that the financial support provided by the Fund should be made more 
flexible to double the limits of access to concessional lending, which required the redesign of the 
Fund's concessional facilities. 
For this purpose, the new poverty reduction growth trust PRGT structure was created as a unified 
facilitation framework this facility is characterized by its duration, funding and adaptation needs, and 
conditionality condition. 
The proposed architecture comprises three new concessional lending facilities and one non-financial 
instrument : 
• The Extended Credit Facility (ECF) succeeds the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) as the Fund’s main tool for providing medium-term support to LICs with protracted balance of 
payments problems. 
• The Standby Credit Facility (SCF) provides financing to LICs with short-term balance of 
payments needs, similar to the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). 
• The Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) provides rapid low-access financing with limited 
conditionality to meet urgent balance of payment needs. 
• The Policy Support Instrument (PSI) remains the Fund’s non-financial policy support tool, 
and can facilitate access to the SCF and RCF, if needed (A New Architecture of Facilities for Low-
Income Countries 2009) 
The aim of these reforms was to make these facilities more flexible and responsive to LIC needs to 
reduce the negative impact of the fluctuations of the global economy on them by providing more 
effective support to meet external and internal shocks and short-term needs 
3) Reviews  20018 /2017  
These recent reviews recommended the need to improve the realism of expectations and their 
suitability with low-income countries to achieve the goals of the IMF programs and work to increase 
the debt sustainability of low-income countries, enhance the quality of financial consolidation, and 
improve the adaptation of structural conditions. 
Poverty reduction and growth strategies are used in IMF-supported programs to (1) link proposed 
program policies with the member’s poverty reduction and growth objectives, (2) preserve national 
ownership of the poverty reduction strategy process, and (3) provide flexibility in scope and coverage 
to reflect particular country circumstances (IMF WEBSITE). 
 
3. Main analytical tools and rules developed by the IMF 
to orientate macroeconomic policies 
 
One of the most important tools the International Monetary Fund uses to help low-income countries 
overcome imbalances in their macroeconomics and raise their levels of development is to control the 
general level of government debt so that it remains within reasonable limits of public debt. It also 
uses fiscal rules to reduce debt and the budget deficit and these rules You will view it in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
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External debt is necessary for low income countries, due to its great need for development, but this 
debt and debt service exceeded the permissible threshold as it became a burden on the budget and 
the resources of these countries. 
The large debt service has depleted the resources of LIC, which affects the growth in these countries 
and reduces their growth rates due to their reduction in public investment. 
Where it was found that each increase by one percentage point in debt service as a percentage of 
GDP leads to a decrease in public investment by about 0.2 percentage points. 
A study conducted on African countries indicates that the relationship between government debt 
and real GDP is weak when the debt is less than 90% of GDP, but if it is above 90% of GDP, this 
reduces growth rates by one percentage point (Public debt, economic growth and inflation In African 
economies 2016). 
Therefore, high standards of debt constitute a danger for growth because they hold back growth and 
debt burden hypothesis   indicates debts that are detrimental to growth when the nominal value of 
external debt exceeds 50% of GDP (Public investment and external growth in external debt in 2003). 
This great risk that the debt burden poses to sustainable growth in low-income countries push many 
development experts and the heads of these countries are calling for the cancellation of this debt 
because it continues to drain the resources of these countries there will be no development. 
 
3.1 Controlling public debt level 
 
In the face of the public deficit in the budget and external and internal shocks, governments in low-
income countries facing a great challenge how to get loans to finance this deficit and face these 
shocks. 
Governments have resorted to several options for financing the deficit These options are borrowing, 
which is two types, either borrowing from the domestic market (banks and investors) or borrowing 
from external market (governments, financial institutions, banks). It can also print money, selling 
assets, or paying through Increased arrears. 
But each of these options has risks as financing through the central bank’s proposal leads to falls for 
net treasury status and increases the external imbalance without additional foreign reserves, which 
leads to a decrease in foreign exchange and a decrease in net foreign assets. 
As for borrowing from banks or private individuals, they weaken private investment due to 
competition (crowding out effect), especially since the banks in LIC prefer lending to the government 
rather than lending to the private sector because lending to the government is guaranteed of 
repayment with large interest rate and short duration. 
Also, excessive borrowing from domestic and broad is rapidly increasing public debt and the country 
may enter a debt crisis, which weakens its credit capacity. 
Ricardo said that the government deficit does not affect the overall economy in the long term, 
assuming that the increase in government expenditures or a reduction in taxes will lead to an 
increase in private savings in the same proportion. Thus, borrowing to finance the budget deficit 
does not affect public investment in the long term because there will be an increase For future taxes 
in order to repay this borrowing and consequently the result is that public investment will not 
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increase due to borrowing, but a number of empirical studies have denied the importance of radical 
equivalence theory for developing countries ( Philippe Beaugrand, Boileau Loko, and Montfort 
Mlachila ’May 2002). 
The most important challenges  for the low-income countries is they cannot access to the 
international financial markets because of their weak credit capacity which made it dependent to a 
large extent on foreign financing  between countries or multilateral organizations such as the 
International fund monetary and world bank but the limited access to foreign aid and external 
borrowing and the existence of emerging  securities markets that may lead to these countries To 
resort more and more to local financing. 
1) Domestic Debt 
Most researchers focus on external debt and neglected domestic debt until recently, despite its 
potentially significant impact on the government budget, macroeconomic stability, loans to the 
private sector, the development of the local financial market, and overall growth.   
Proponents of domestic debt praise its importance and positive impact on growth and savings and its 
significant contribution to the development of the financial market and question the scheduling of 
policies that prevent domestic debt and say that a shortage of domestic debt may be an impediment 
to development for the financial market in countries where the size of domestic debt is small and 
capital markets are also underdeveloped , Adoption of zero domestic debt policies may complicate 
exit from dependence on loans and foreign aid 
Domestic debt markets can help boost financial and financial markets, increase private savings and 
stimulate investment. For example, government securities are a vital tool for indirect monetary 
policy operations, and they can also help banks manage their liquidity effectively, and reduce central 
bank intervention that could distort the financial sector. 
A study of 66 countries with low-income countries 1979-1993 found that domestic debt was less 
expensive to finance the budget than foreign debt. Another study at 73 after 1990, Hauner2006 
found that domestic debt begins to harm financial development when levels are too high, although 
this study excludes low-income countries whose levels of domestic debt are usually low (S.M. ALI 
ABBAS and JAKOB E. CHRISTENSEN June 2007). 
However, domestic debt also has many negative impacts, among which is the crowding out of private 
investment by containing private savings that would have been directed to investing in the private 
sector as it raises the cost of capital, and diminishing the demand for private investment also. 
The accumulation of domestic debt makes them absorb government resources to a large extent, and 
this is what drives them also to crowd out public investment and social spending that serves the 
interests of the poor and also the accumulation of large domestic debt also places debt sustainability 
in danger for the low-income countries that are already suffering from large external debt. 
In low-income countries, domestic debt is mostly short-term, but governments may resort to 
extending it continuously, because of its continued need for it or its inability to pay these debts. This 
increases the domestic debt service, which may force the government to print the currency in order 
to pay the accumulated local debt, which leads to more inflation (Mohamed 2009). Worse than this, 
if the extension period is prolonged, the banks will not finance private investments and will 
monopolize their funds to lend to the government because they prefer a large easy profit from the 
government (Ibrahim AYUBA K., Shazida MOHD KHAN 2019). 
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According to some writers, there was little academic and political interest in understanding the 
potential relationship between domestic debt and economic growth in low-income countries as a 
result of the lack of good data on the size of domestic debt in low-income countries. 
Many governments in low-income countries resort to borrowing from the local financial market to 
overcome the budget deficit, due to their limited access to international financial markets or the 
difficulty of obtaining concessional loans from international lenders such as the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Financial systems in low-income countries are considered underdeveloped system, so they are an 
obstacle to establishing effective domestic financial markets that governments can benefit from in a 
rational and effective way in the time of distress, because it is noted that the interest rates applied 
on the governments  in the local financial market in low-income countries are much greater than the 
interest rates  applies to concessional loans  in the external market  and also the local debt are 
mostly at short-term  while the concessional loans are provided on long-term basis. 
For example, countries eligible for the PRG program such as countries with economies in fragile or 
affected by natural and health disasters, they can benefit from financing ECF and SCF programs with 
a zero interest rate at least until 2021 with a grace period of 5 years and 4 years, respectively, and a 
final maturity of 10 years and 8 years Respectively (IMF website). 
Therefore, it is surprising that governments borrow from the local market in light of the opportunity 
to obtain concessional loans from external market. 
The prevailing belief is that the accumulation of domestic debt in low-income countries has a 
negative impact on private investment and the sustainability of public debt and thus negatively affect 
the growth and poverty reduction programs. 
For the impact of domestic debt on Private Sector Credit, Jakob Christensen (2004) found significant 
support for the crowding out hypothesis; on average across countries, an expansion in domestic debt 
of 1 percent relative to broad money causes the ratio of lending to the private sector to broad money 
to decline. 
Government lending from the local financial market, May reduce credit available for private sector 
for a given money supply expansion , which leads to raising real interest rates and thus reducing 
private investment as a result of direct overcrowding on savings and liquidity in the market. Market 
by governments, as well as banks in low-income countries, prefer to lend government rather than 
the private sector to reduce their risk. 
2) External Debt 
Throughout the history of global crises, low-income countries suffer more than other countries of the 
world from the shocks of these crises, such as the current global crisis, the Corona pandemic crisis, as 
these crises show the weakness of the financial structure of these countries and their urgent need for 
donations and external debt as a paramedic necessary for them to operate as do the artificial 
respiratory system with a Corona patient! 
Low-income countries face significant fiscal challenges because of the weak structure of their volatile 
economies and their sensitivity to external shocks, as a result of their low income, these countries 
depend on their revenues on external debt, but their inability to pay these debts causes an 
accumulation of external debt service that enters them in a vicious circle of borrowing to pay debts, 
which it leads to an increase in debt again.  
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This payment process creates many problems for many low-income countries because the debt 
service is much greater than the amount of the original debt, because of the high interest rate 
therefore it imposes a number of restrictions on the growth strategy of these countries and drains a 
lot of their fiscal resources and often low-income countries are forced to take more debt because it is 
in the development stage. 
Benedict Clements (et al, 2003) suggested that foreign borrowing has a positive impact on 
investment and growth of a country up to a threshold level but external debt service can potentially 
affect the growth as most of the funds will go in the repayment of the debt rather in the investments 
(Benedict Clements, Rina Bhattacharya, and Toan Quoc Nguyen December 2003). 
Debt service can have a significant negative impact on growth in low-income countries (as opposed 
to the total debt stock) and this is the main channels on how accumulation of debt and service 
payment may affect long term growth: 
1/ The accumulation of external debt service makes debt like a snowball, so the accumulation of debt 
burdens weighs heavily on the budgets of low-income countries and enters them into a continuous 
state of permanent deficit, and thus the state resorts to borrowing from abroad in order to cover the 
budget deficit and thus enters into a vicious circle of debt in order to pay the accumulated debt 
service  This weakens the country's credit capacity in the long term, canceling the role of external 
debt to stimulate the growth process 
2/ As high debt service can crowd out public investments by changing the composition of public 
spending, because it absorbs the resources of the annual government budget and this causes a large 
budget deficit that is difficult for the government to finance this deficit and thus resort to austerity 
policy targeting public expenditures in order to pay the debt service and this has a negative impact 
on Infrastructure and human capital, which reduces growth within the country and also the High 
debt service can raise the government’s bill, and this increases the public deficit, which reduces 
public savings, which leads to higher interest rates, which reduces private investment, which reduces 
growth. 
Public spending must be one of the most important determinants of economic growth and social 
welfare, because it includes spending on health and education, while public investment in 
infrastructure is the key to a boom in private investment. 
 Some researchers have found that debt service in low-income countries affects total government 
spending with the exception of defense spending. Mahdavi (2004) finds “support for the adverse 
effect of the debt burden on “capital expenditure” in the full sample and in the Middle East-North 
Africa and sub-Saharan Africa subsamples where the debt burden was relatively high. Among 
components of “current expenditure,” increased debt burden shifted the shares against “nonwage 
goods services” and “subsidy and transfers” while leaving the share of politically sensitive category of 
“wages and salaries” unscathed in most cases.” 
A study on 35 sub Saharan countries showed that debt service restraint shifts spending away from 
the social sector with a similar impact on health and education. In a study conducted on 35 sub-
Saharan countries between 1975 and 1994 on the effect of external debt service (Augustin Kwasi 
Fosu, 2007). 
 In the case of Nigeria, the negative impact of debt service on public spending is evident in the year of 
2000, the government allocated $ 1.9 billion to service debts, and this amount is four times greater 
than the federal government allocated to education and is twelve times greater than it allocated to 
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health, and in 2001 it allocated 2,13$  billion in debt service is six times greater than education 
spending and seventeen times health spending (Muzna Gohar, Niaz Ahmed Bhutto, Falahuddin Butt 
2006). 
The case of Nigeria shows the ugliness of depleting the public debt service of the resources of poor 
countries, even though Nigeria is an oil producing country, but the situation is probably worse for 
low-income countries. 
In analyzing the impact of foreign debt and external debt service on savings and   investment 
expenditures in Pakistan, Imran Sharif (2009) find the external debt has a negative impact on national 
savings and that external debt has a positive impact on national investment activity.  This indicates 
the external debts were used for consumption, which had a negative impact on public savings, but 
was allocated inefficiently, and this positively affected public investment, but it did not affect 
economic growth (Imran Sharif Chaudhry, Shahnawaz Malik & Muhammad Ramzan, 2009). 
The reason for the accumulation of debt burden is the failure of low-income countries to pay the 
installments agreed in debt contracts for various reasons, including what they may control, and some 
that are not controlled, such as external shocks and unexpected disasters, and therefore the failure 
to pay increases the debt service which acts as vacuum of the country's resources. 
In order to overcome the problems of reimbursement, the governments of low income countries 
enter into negotiations with international funders to reschedule debts, which often results in 
commitments to reduce public spending, which is first victim is education, health and infrastructure, 
and this has a direct negative impact on the human factor, which weakens the productivity and 
affects long-term growth. 
 
3.2 Fiscal rules    
 
In the past, the use of fiscal rules as a method of fiscal policy was limited to developed economies, 
but in the mid-nineties increased use of these rules by developing countries EMDEs and now most of 
the countries applying these rules are became developing countries. 
At the end of 2012, the 76 countries with one or more fiscal rule, 28 were developed economies and 
48 were EMDEs . This map below documents the spread of fiscal rules in the developing world. 
Most the low-income countries,  started to work with fiscal rules in 1998, 2000 and 2002, 
respectively, such as the West African Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Central African Economic 
and Monetary Community (CEMAC) where the primary purpose of these rules was to facilitate the 
convergence of financial policies within monetary unions in general(Elva Bova, Nathalie Carcenac, 
and Martine Guerguil, 2014). 
There are two forms of enforcing fiscal rules : 
1/ The supra-national fiscal rules, which are applied by the monetary unions and imposed on their 
member states to achieve specific goals, such as the rules imposed by CEMAC on its member states 
and inspired by the European Union rules. 
2/ The national fiscal rules, which are applied by all countries of their will and according to their fiscal 
status and goals. 
14 
 
The IMF supports countries to use fiscal rules in low-income countries and provides them with 
technical assistance to ensure that these rules align with their goals and ensure their 
implementation, as it see the benefit of the fiscal rules for these distorted economies. 
Fiscal rules are used as a tool for economic stability, as fiscal rules reduce the extent of the business 
cycle by curbing government spending during prosperity and working to create buffer savings that 
are used in times of crisis also Most fiscal rules work to sustain public debt and keep it within 
reasonable limits that serve development and fiscal stability. 
In order to achieve these complex goals, most governments use more than one rule, but the most 
important criterion for choosing these rules is that they are simple and easy to communicate with 
the public. 
The use of financial rules is not without some risks, especially for low-income countries with weak 
administrative efficiency and the great need for further growth. For example, fiscal rules leave less 
room to adapt to shocks and low-income countries are subject to many difficult-to-predict and 
external shocks such as environmental disasters, pandemics, fluctuations of the global economy and 
its unstable political and social conditions. 
Fiscal rules also may reduce government spending to the detriment of vital sectors such as spending 
on infrastructure, health, education, and social spending on the poor. These are things that hinder 
long-term growth and increase poverty rates and severity in these countries. 
Undermining transparency due to incentives for creative accounting is one of the concerns of using 
fiscal rules (Kumar, 2009). 
In this part we will be exposed the fiscal rules in detail to know their characteristics, benefits and 
drawbacks, and we will take a one of the low-income country as a empirical case of applying financial 
rules. 
 
1) FISCAL RULES : definitions & characteristics 
Fiscal rule is defined as a long-lasting constraint on fiscal policy through numerical limits on 
budgetary aggregates (defined as standing commitments to specified numerical targets for some key 
budget and/or debt aggregates and to some procedures) (IMF 2009). 
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The theoretical literature defines a fiscal rule as a stable policy reaction function; that is, a formula 
that links fiscal instruments (for example, tax rate, expenditure, borrowing) to macroeconomic 
indicators in an optimal way. The aim of the Fiscal rules is to maximize the welfare of society by 
working to stabilize the macro economy by adjusting the financial position during the business cycle 
to ensure debt sustainability and meet budgetary constraints ( Howe to select fiscal rules Joint Bank-
Fund Library 2018). 
The criterias 
The “good” fiscal rules are generally selected on the basis of desired features initially proposed by 
Kopits and Symansky (1998). These criteria aim to ensure the rule efficiency and to be able to correct 
fiscal policy biases and ensure economic stability. 
• Sustainability: Compliance with the rule should ensure long-term debt sustainability. 
 • Stabilization: Following the rule should not increase (and might even decrease) economic volatility. 
Economic stabilization requires that the rule lets automatic stabilizers operate and/or allows 
discretionary countercyclical changes in taxes or expenditures. 
 • Simplicity: The rule should be easily understood by decision makers and the public. 
 • Operational guidance: It should be possible to translate the rule into clear guidance in the annual 
budget process. Budget aggregates targeted by the rule should be largely under the control of the 
policymaker. 
 • Resilience: A rule should be in place for a sustained period to build credibility, and it should not be 
easily abandoned after a shock.  
• Ease of monitoring and enforcement: Compliance with the rule should be easy to verify, and there 
should be costs associated with deviations from target(( how to select the fiscal rules IMF 2015) 
There is no perfect number of fiscal rules that fiscal authorities can operate in the same period but 
the most important pillar of a good fiscal framework is to choose the rule that reduces the need for 
tradeoff between the criteria’s, and also take the country condition in the account, but the adopting 
of multiple rules for multiple goals, could lead to overlapping and opposing objectives. 
2) Types of Fiscal Rules 
Four main types of fiscal rules can be distinguished based on the type of budgetary aggregate that 
they seek to constrain, The rules have different properties with regard to the objectives, operational 
guidance, and transparency. 
I-Budget balance rules  
A-The overall balance rules 
The overall balance rules impose a ceiling for the public deficit They are set in nominal terms (that is, 
without adjusting for the cycle) and in percent of GDP, which is easy to calculate, monitor, and 
implement, and it is effective in supporting the sustainable public debt policy, but it does not contain 
good economic stability features Long-term growth prospects can suffer if the level or quality of 
public investment is negatively affected 
A variant of the overall balance rule called the “primary balance rule,” excludes interest of debt from 
the balance, targeting a primary balance can put the debt on an explosive path if the rule threshold is 
not reassessed regularly 
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B-Cyclically Adjusted Balance rules 
Cyclically Adjusted Balance Rules impose limits on the overall balance, correcting for the effects of 
business cycle fluctuations on revenue and expenditure (Fedelino, Horton, and Ivanova 2009).  
The Cyclically adjusted balance rules aim to provide better economic stability than the nominal 
budget balances rules by separating expenditure and revenue and allowing the automatic stabilizer  
to operate freely 
These rules can achieve stability in the expenditure path even though they do not compel the 
government to cut spending in times of deflation. However, the ability of these rules for the stability 
is limited by two factors. 
1/ Automatic stabilizers can be small in some countries; for instance, when the tax system relies 
predominantly on customs revenue. 
2/ Cyclically-adjusted balance rules do not allow changes in the fiscal stance. Once a country has 
achieved its targeted cyclically-adjusted balance, complying with the rule requires that the fiscal 
position remain constant over time ( how to select the fiscal rules IMF 2015). 
C-The golden rule 
Golden rules impose a ceiling on the current balance deficit (overall balance without capital 
expenditure). Borrowing is only allowed for financing capital expenditure Current spending must be 
financed from revenue. This rule is considered pro-growth and more consistent in equity between 
generations because it entitles the burden of financing public investment projects from this 
generations to future generations because they are the real beneficiaries from these public 
investments 
Excluding capital expenditure from the objective makes it possible to borrow for investment without 
restrictions, and that can create risks in debt sustainability. It may also expose these projects to 
accounting manipulation and the incentives for cost-benefit analysis can be reduced (Balasson and 
Franco, 2000). 
D-Over-the-Cycle Budget Balance Rules 
What distinguishes this rule from other budget balance rules is not the budgetary aggregate it 
constrains but rather how the limit constraining the budgetary aggregate is assessed. Instead of 
being defined and assessed annually, the limit is typically set and assessed as an average over the 
years encompassing all stages of the business cycle, including both expansionary and contractionary 
stages. 
II- Expenditure Rules 
Expenditure rules set limits on total, primary, or current spending, and the limits apply to nominal or 
real expenditure. They are typically set in absolute terms (levels) or growth rates and occasionally in 
percent of GDP, with a time horizon that typically ranges from three to five years (Lledó and others, 
2017). 
III-Revenue Rules 
Revenue rules set floors or impose ceilings on government’s income proceeds. They are relatively 
rare in comparison with the other types of rules. Some countries impose floors on revenues to 
increase resources by increasing taxes in order to implement certain policies as a country belonging 
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to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Other countries may impose a ceiling 
on revenues in order to reduce the tax burden on citizens. setting a floor or impose ceilings for 
revenues may hinder efforts for total stability, especially if the floors are expressed in the level and 
not in the percentage of GDP, revenue floors may require increasing taxes in bad times and revenue 
ceilings can limit government savings in the good times (Joint Bank-Fund Library 2018). 
IV-Debt rules 
Debt rules set an explicit limit or target for public debt in percent of GDP. This type of rule is, by 
definition, the most effective in terms of ensuring convergence to a debt target. However, it does not 
provide sufficient guidance for fiscal policy when debt is well below its ceiling (Carlo Cottarelli  
December 16, 2009).   
3) Rules for Developing Countries 
The economies of low income countries are experiencing a lot of volatility, which makes their 
revenues volatile as well, as a result of several factors, -according to the few studies that have been 
conducted on fiscal rules in low income countries- as the larger and longer expansions of the 
business cycle of this countries (Hausmann, Panizza, and Rigobon, 2006) and Also the terms-of-trade 
shocks (when commodity or trade constitutes a large share of the tax base) and  Natural disasters, 
and  volatile external financing flows and structural transformations of the economies of these 
countries(Joint Bank-Fund Library 2018) . 
As result of this structural problems we cannot apply the previous rules in these countries without 
modification and taking into account each country and its economic situation and the most challenge 
for low income countries is the difficulties of stabilizing public spending in face to the Major 
development needs for infrastructure, such as investment in health and education... 
We can divide the low income country to types: raw material export country and non-exporting 
country. 
I-Countries exporting raw material  
The goals of the fiscal rules in exporters commodities countries is the stabilization and public debt 
sustainability by taking into account two points: 
1/ Commodity price fluctuations in international markets jeopardize the stability of these countries' 
economies. 
 2/ The issue of resource depletion is the biggest challenge facing countries with a relatively short 
reserve horizon, and therefore the primary purpose of these financial rules is to define sustainable 
spending and savings for current and future generations to preserve wealth over time and ensure 
equity between generations. 
Fiscal rules for countries exporting commodities : 
A- Revenue split rules: It is placing a certain amount or percentage of revenue on the side of savings 
in order not to be drained as expenditures for the same fiscal year and keep them for times of 
shortage. 
B- Price smoothing rules: it aimed to split revenue by calculating the reference price of the 
commodity, if actual resource revenue exceeds resource revenue with the reference price of the 
commodity, the difference between the two prices is saved for periods of lower commodity prices in 
the future and this rule works to reduce revenue fluctuations in the short term. 
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This group of rules separates public spending from volatile revenue sources in order to reduce 
fluctuations in the fiscal stance and the stability of the economy as a whole but the weaknesses of 
these two rules, is they only care about the revenue and savings and do not place restrictions on 
borrowing and this exposes these countries to future debt crisis through unlimited borrowing to 
finance the annual budget deficit resulting from the increase in spending. 
C- Structural balance rules: These rules correct the economic situation and commodity prices 
together, and this rule may be seen as a complex case of the rule of Price smoothing rules, but it 
differs greatly from it, as it places restrictions on total spending and not only spending funded by 
revenue but spending funded also from borrowing. 
 D-Expenditure rules: They are easy to understand and apply their primary goal is to limit spending in 
times of good price by limiting the government spending growth in a percentage of non-source GDP. 
Expenditure rules and structural balance rules may achieve economic stability more than the 
previous two rules because they limit the spending to reduce the annual fiscal deficit, which is the 
first reason for excessive borrowing and economic volatility. 
II-Low income country not exporting commodities 
A-Simple expenditure rules 
Low-income countries that do not issue raw materials relies on financing their expenditures and 
budget deficits on grants and external loans, so their revenues are volatile and therefore the best 
fiscal rules that are compatible with them are the simple spending rules because they provide a 
better shield for revenue fluctuations (Cored and others, 2015) and as we have seen previously the  
most of  other rules do not protect the public spending in a way that is consistent with the large 
needs of the lack of development in these countries as more infrastructure. 
 Despite the stability of spending, the economic environment in low income countries has remained 
volatile, as the fiscal policies in these countries tend to be cyclical even though, according to some 
experimental studies, it could have been countercyclical to the economic cycle, and experts refer this 
bias to two factors: 
1/ Imperfect access to international credit markets and lack of financial depth prevent developing 
countries from borrowing in bad times (Konuki and Villafuerte, 2016). 
2/ Good times encourage fiscal profligacy and rent-seeking activities tries with weak political 
institutions (how to select the fiscal rules IMF, 2015). 
Therefore, as a conclusion  fiscal rules can correct this cyclical bias if it is the result of fiscal profligacy 
in times of prosperity by imposing restrictions on spending, for example, but if this bias is caused by 
ineffective financial markets, fiscal rules cannot be the only solution. 
 
4) Fiscal rules used by IMF and countries 
In the reality, most fiscal rules target the revenues, total debt stock, the annual budget deficit or 
specific categories of expenditure. 
Fiscal rules combination 
Over time As a result of the multiplicity of goals and the complexity of the fiscal situation of 
countries, most countries have come to adopt a set of rules closely related at the same time and may 
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adopt national and supranational rules, although this may cause many complications and deviations 
from the goals, especially in low-income countries with weak experience but technical assistance 
provides by the International Monetary Fund may help this countries to choose the appropriate rules 
for them. 
 The table below shows that most countries are using more than one rule at the same time. 
 
Source (Nikhil Ray Agustin Velasquez Iyanatul Islam, 2015  )   
 
5)  Role of Fiscal Rules for sustaining Growth : Some New Evidence 
One of the most important challenges facing experts and policy maker of the International Monetary 
Fund and the Lowe income countries is the extent to which financial rules are compatible with low-
income countries, do fiscal rules support growth, contribute to stabilize public debt and reduce 
economic fluctuations? Are they suitable to absorb the many shocks suffered by low-income 
countries? 
In light of the few writings on the role of financial rules in the development Lowe income countries, I 
will review some of the results of one of the studies Nikhil Ray Agustin Velasquez Iyanatul Islam 
(2015) that also compares the Low income countries withe Upper-Middle between low-income 
countries that adopt fiscal rules and low-income countries that do not adopt fiscal rules. Income 
countries through some economic indicators that relate to the growth of per capita GDP and rates  
Public debt over a 16-year period from 1997 to 2013. 
The growth per capita data is from the World Bank’s (2014) World Development Indicators, while the 




Source:  Nikhil Ray Agustin Velasquez Iyanatul Islam (2015)    
From a look at the growth of per capita GDP, we can notice that low-income countries with Fiscal 
Rules are a little better than the LIC Without   Fiscal Rules, but it is not significant (the P value is 0.25) 
on the contrary, the all developing countries without fiscal rules are a little better than the countries 
with fiscal rules but this difference   is also not significant (the P value is 0.40).  We can see the upper 
middle-income category has a 0.5 per cent better as difference but also is not significant the P value 
is 0.16. None of these differences in mean growth per capita is statistically significant. 
In terms of central government debt as measured by debt-to-GDP ratio the All Developing Countries 
without fiscal rules has less debt than the countries with fiscal rules but the difference is not 
significant (the P value is 0.27). For the LIC without fiscal rules the level of debt is less than the LIC 
with fiscal rules and the difference is statistically significant (P Value is 0.01).  
Low-income countries with fiscal rules had debt levels of 99 per cent of their GDP on average, 
whereas those without fiscal rules had an average of 76 per cent of their GDP. On explanation might 
be that nine of the 10 low-income countries with fiscal rules are part of the Heavily-Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative, so their existing central government debt in the 1990s was very high. 
Since then, the HIPC initiative only partially wrote off these governments’ debts. Fifteen of the 
remaining 24 low-income countries without fiscal rules were part of the HIPC initiative, which may 
reduce the debt burden in that subset (Nikhil Ray Agustin Velasquez Iyanatul Islam, 2015). 
For the Lower-Middle-Income Countries we can see the countries with fiscal rules has more public 
debt than the countries without fiscal rules but the difference is not significant (the P value is 0.13). 
In the upper-middle-income category the countries without fiscal rules tended to accumulate 7 per 
cent more central government debt on average and the difference is significant (the P value is 0.01). 
It may perhaps reflect the fact that more developed economies have easier access to external and 
21 
 
internal finance (Kawai and Morgan, 2013). They can borrow more easily and thus have higher debt 
levels if unconstrained by fiscal rules. 
 
3.3 Country Case Examples 
 
Here we will take the Cameroon as an example to know the impact of fiscal rules on the long-term 
growth and debt sustainability in this country, Cameroon is a member of the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa (EMCCA,) sharing a common currency, the CFA Franc, with the Central 
African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of Congo. The EMCCA, Member 
States convergence criteria are inspired by the European Union’s Maastricht Cameroon is a small 
economy and a commodity-exporter, especially oil. It is using the fiscal rules which was imposed as 
criteria by (EMCCA,) in 2002 as budget balance rules and debt rules for convergence as well as to 
guide governments’ members in the union to prioritize some aspects of spending related to the 
development goals. 
Cameroon is an oil exporter, so oil plays a major role in the government budget, at around 15% of 
GDP Since 1985 Oil revenue has been subject to fiscal rule rules to take into account depleting 
reserves and the volatility of oil prices.  
The 2002 EMCCA, convergence criteria are outlined in the table below. 
“Since January 2002, the main criteria (first row) provide that: (i) the ratio of basic fiscal balance to 
GDP must be positive or null, (ii) the debt ratio must not exceed 70% of GDP, (iii) countries should not 
accumulate arrears of interest to both internal and external debt, (iv) and finally the maximum 
inflation rate is 3%.” (Nikhil Ray ,Agustin Velasquez,Iyanatul Islam, 2015) 
Cameroon used two kinds of fiscal rules since 2002 : the Budget balance rules and Debt rules. 
 
Source: Nikhil Ray, Agustin Velasquez, Iyanatul Islam (2015) 
The International Monetary Fund imposed an overall budget balance rule on Cameroon between 
2000-2004 as part of the Poverty Reduction Facility and set zero as a target for budget deficits 
without oil resources. 
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In 2008 the EMCCA, Commission introduced two supplementary criteria. First, the basic structural 
fiscal balance as a proportion of nominal GDP should be in balance or surplus. This rule, as we have 
seen, it is used to correct the economic situation of the country and correct commodity prices, and 
the aim here is to reduce the volatility of government revenue by introducing average oil prices 
within three years in accounting for it also places restrictions on spending and reducing the 
government deficit. Second, the non-oil basic fiscal balance as a proportion of non-oil GDP should be 
in balance or in surplus. This rule partially protects government finances from volatility in the price of 
oil and also reduces expenditures, and this reduces the government deficit (Nikhil Ray Agustin 
Velasquez Iyanatul Islam, 2015).   
It is known that this rule is easy to apply and monitor and good for maintaining sustainable public 
debt but it limits government spending, which weakens public investment, which negatively affects 
growth in the long term. This is what happened in Cameroon, where the growth was limited, which 
we will see later with detailed data. 
 
Source: Nikhil Ray, Agustin Velasquez,Iyanatul Islam (2015) 
Growth in GDP per capita, it was negative until the mid-nineties, where it was in the range -2 and -5 
to increased 1994 and 1995 from -2, -5 to 0.5 to continue above 2% for three years, before the 
CEMAC adopted its fiscal rules. Since then, it has remained mainly in a band between 0 per cent and 
2 per cent, aside from 2005 and 2009 when Cameroonian growth per capita was negative. However, 
from 2010 to 2019 it increased slightly in the range from 3.08 to 3,65 (World Bank). 
We can notice from the graph the Cameroon's debt was very large in 1999, when it exceeded 80% of 
the GDP, but after Cameroon benefitted from the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 
1999, the debt took a low path in 2000 to continue in the same direction because of the Convergence 
Criteria adopted in 2002 so that the debt continues to decline to a level less than 20  % Of GDP, 
which is good for a low-income country but from the table below we can see  the public debt has 
been attributed to the increase in recent years, and this is evident from the table above. It has taken 





Source IMF CAMIRON REPORT January 7, 2020 
For the employment was vulnerable it is decreased gradually from 81 per cent to 75 per cent of the 
labor force, while the unemployment trend has been more erratic, swinging from 3.4 per cent of the 
labor force in 1995 to 8.1 per cent the following year, and then decreasing to 3.8 per cent in 2012 
(Nikhil Ray, Agustin Velasquez, Iyanatul Islam, 2015). 
 
                                                       Cameron compliance indicators for CEMAC fiscal rules 
 
Source : BIKAI J. Landry/June 2015 
Source : BIKAI J. Landry1 June 2015 
Through all this information and a summary, we can observe that Cameroon was more CEMAC 
countries comply with the fiscal rules imposed by the Union through their best response to the rules 
of fiscal adaptation where the rules of budget balance were applied to reduce the budget deficit by 
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imposing ceilings on revenues and expenditures and also in 2008 the CEMAC   impose new rules  to 
reduce fluctuations Revenues in  by including oil revenue in the budget at an average price of three 
years, and oil revenue were also isolated to reduce spending. 
Cameroon also used the debt rules imposed by CEMAC in the year 2002, and Cameroon was the best  
student of the Union in order to maintain a low level of debt, although Cameroon started reducing its 
debt since 2000 when It benefited from the HIPC initiative but  maintained a sustainable debt level 
after that due to the fiscal rules. 
Despite these fiscal rules, Cameroon had low levels of employment and did not achieve high growth 
rates, and this may be due to reducing public expenditures as a result of strict compliance with the 
fiscal rules imposed by CEMAC, which cannot let the  deficit goes over 3% of GDP, and this causes the 
government to resort to reducing public investments. In general, such as spending on infrastructure 
and health education... This leads to limit long-term growth, and this is may be one of the drawbacks 
of supranational fiscal rules. Here, I will advise them to use national fiscal rules increase spending on 
public investments through deficits, but with great caution, with the selection of more efficient 
projects with compliance the flexible fiscal debt rules that limit the public debt. 
This is what some researchers went to and some opposed it as Lossifiv and others (2009) they cited 
that Cameroon can finance by deficit more public investment, and more spending on human capital 
for long-term growth  But some writers like snake et al 2013 express their concerns about following 
the path of financing public investment through  deficit for more growth and they justify this by the 
weakness of the government's administrative capabilities and the inefficiency of public investment, 
but they prefer to comply with the fiscal rules imposed by CEMAC and they see this rules as a good 
way to prioritize government spending  Related to the development goals. 
 
4. Major criticisms against IMF approach (pro/cons) 
 
There are some studies that have found that the intervention of the International Monetary Fund has 
a significant positive impact on low-income countries. 
The International Monetary Fund notes that although there may be negative effects of adjustment 
policies on poverty due to the contraction of economic activity in the short term, it is expected that 
the poor will achieve more benefits in the long term as presented a study analyzing 86 low and 
middle income countries between 1982  And 2009 and which shows is evidence that the inclusion of 
poverty alleviation in the agenda of the International Monetary Fund has led to its desired effects  
This study says that the harmful consequences of the International Monetary Fund’s interventions 
die in the short term and found that the income is distributed more equally in countries that have 
spent many years dealing with the IMF and provide evidence of the role of the IMF’s programs in  
alleviating the severity of poverty in the countries where they were applied in (Doris A. 
Oberdabernig, 2012). 
A study that was done on a sample of countries exclusively from the LIC  over 30 years this countries  
dealing with the short and long-term impact of the IMF’s programs this study finds the IMF programs   
helped  LIC  sustain economic growth and boost resilience by building fiscal buffers, even though the 
size of the International Monetary Fund’s funding does not have a significant impact on economic 
growth. , and this may indicate the prominent role of the IMF’s political advice in building the 
institutional capacity of these countries, and the IMF financial support  have had a significant positive 
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impact on  short-term growth when the LIC face imbalances or external shocks(Christian Mumssen, 
Yasemin Bal Gündüz, Christian Ebeke, and Linda Kaltani, 2013). 
In another study conducted on the sample of low-income countries participating in the programs of 
the International Monetary Fund during the period 1989 and 2008, it found that the facilitated 
programs have had a positive impact in general on economic growth for a period of up to two years 
after the signing of the agreement, but the effects are due to other factors such as the initial 
economic conditions of the country  Past growth performance, dependency on aid, debt, and recent 
history of participating in IMF programs and time period (Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands, 2017). 
Despite all the evidence presented by researchers on the role of the IMF programs in economic 
stability and growth in the long run, these programs have a cost that may be large and painful, 
especially for the low income countries and the poor in these countries where the IMF interferes 
because the poor are the ones who pay the price first. Before others, the IMF’s programs and their 
legitimacy have been exposed to a lot of criticism. Here we will show some examples. 
A study conducted on the International Monetary Fund describes  as a financial institution whose 
role is to preserve the interests of the rich industrialized countries it controls and also criticized the 
conditionality system in the IMF programs and  secrecy that was surrounded by and also described 
conditionality as illegal and immoral to the fact that the IMF   provides the resources needed by the  
governments and asks them to do what they do not want, also the legitimacy is further undermined 
because conditionality is not a panacea. this study criticized the conditionality routine as merely 
copying the overlapping conditions in a country, regardless of whether they are appropriate to the 
local conditions of the country and concluded the IMF policies failed to promote economic growth 
(Conditionality from function and history/ Sarah Babb and Bruce, 2008). 
Another study says that the size of benefiting from the IMF loans is greater when countries have a 
greater share in the IMF, just as rich countries like USA and European countries they have a major 
impact on the policies of the IMF because most of its senior employees in the IMF  are their citizens  
and also found that increased participation in IMF programs  It has a negative impact instead of 
larger loans it found also the participation in  IMF programs has a negative impact on the rule of law 
and  has an indirect negative impact on economic growth but  that is difficult to demonstrate in a 
simple causal way .The moral hazard, according to the study, is that IMF loans may encourage 
governments to spend excessively and increase government bureaucracy. The conditionality system 
is detrimental to the growth and IMF programs also affect the size and structure of private credit 
markets. This study answers the question: Why do governments resort to IMF loans as long as they 
are bad for the economy growth  ?? first The study says that IMF lending is bad for the economy, but 
it is good for governments, politicians. second IMF lending reduces GDP but increases government 
income .third IMF lending reduces growth in the short term, but it may raise growth in the long run, 
even though this study failed to find evidences for increase in the growth in the long term for at least 
for 5 years. According to the study, there are questions that can be raised about long-term growth, is 
it really due to the IMF programs?  Or is it just a result of a serious will to reform the economic 
situation by governments in the long term?  However, these answers require further studies (Robert 
j.Barroa, jong .wha leeb, 2005). 
The IMF's support for a country's programs is also seen as a catalytic role in promoting, availability 
and stability of long-term resource flows to the country. A Study is based on interviews with suppliers 
of funds, case studies and econometric work all demonstrate that the Fund’s catalytic role is very 
limited (The Hague, 2005). 
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Another study was conducted on 98 countries that participated in the IMF programs between 1970 
and 2000 and found that the IMF programs reduce the growth rates and have a negative impact, 
although they found that compliance with the conditionality of these programs is limiting this overall 
negative impact. Also, it found the IMF loans effect is not statistically significant (AXELDREHER, 2006). 
In a study of 86 low- and middle-income countries between 1982 and 2009 on the impact of IMF 
lending programs on poverty and inequality, I found that these programs have negative impacts on 
the poor and inequality in the short term for the entire sample while for the sample from 2000 to 
2009 found the opposite as most of these negative effects that were present in the short term 
disappeared in the long run (DORIS A. OBERDABERNIG, 2013). 
 Finally, I present this study that was conducted on 16 West African countries in the period 
1995/2014 about the negative impact of IMF programs on government spending on health sector. 
This study found that IMF programs limit investment in the health sector and  reduce the resources 
of the sector and the number of workers in it, such as nurses  And it  fended the IMF programs  
reduce the government health spending  by 0.248% per capita. 
The study says that the conditionality of IMF programs impedes achieving universal health coverage 
in West African countries by imposing a reduction in government spending, and this  have a negative 






The fiscal rules in low-income countries are very important. It helps to increase economic growth and 
stability by reducing procyclicality of policy if it is well design . Often, the fiscal rules combine the 
objectives of sustainability with the need for flexibility to account for economic shocks. 
The supranational rules have proven their efficiency for the economic unions and countries monetary 
union because they maintain a certain level of fiscal discipline, especially with regard the level of 
budget deficits and the level of inflation and interest rate. As for the national rules, they are also 
important because they help governments to control the level of public debt by keeping the budget 
deficit within reasonable limits, by butting a ceiling on the spending. Fiscal rules also avoid oil-
exporting countries the oil market price fluctuations, and creating a fiscal buffer for these countries, 
which helps them absorb unexpected external and internal shocks. 
The weaknesses of fiscal rules are  they may not be applicable in all circumstances. In major crises as 
financial crises 2008, countries may abandon their application of these rules, and their lack of 
flexibility and big gap of growth in low-income countries   may make them limit growth in these 
countries. 
The stabilization policies and fiscal rules have not achieved much growth in the long term, at least for 
the past 10 years Growth rates have remained very low because stabilization policies and fiscal rules 
have been primarily aimed at reducing the annual budget deficit by imposing restrictions on 
government investment spending what  effect the infrastructure, health and education spending and 
this has had a positive impact on the level of debt and the negative impact on development on long 
term. 
Maintaining public debt at reasonable levels is very important for low-income countries, but its 
increase is necessary for the development process in these countries due to its limited revenue and 
their great need for more infrastructure and spending on health and education in order to form 
future generations. 
The main challenge for policy makers in these countries and in the International Monetary Fund is to 
design stabilization policies and fiscal rules that achieve the balance between general investment 
these countries need in order to grow and maintain debt sustainability in the same time and that’s 
can be tough. 
Improve the performance of restriction policies on public spending and align them with the 
development needs of each country and reduce their negative impacts on the poor and on 
development in general. 
Improve public government investments and make them more effective and more benefit. 
Mobilizing local resources and working to increase government revenues by reforming the tax 
system and expanding the tax base without including farmers, miniatures, occupations, free and 
unrated businesses, and small projects, as they are the livelihoods of the poor. 
The International Monetary Fund and the governments of these countries should strive to forgive 
low-income countries from debts or at least debt service, which has become one of the biggest 
sources of annual government budget drain and the biggest crowd of public investment spending 
that is the basis of long-term development. 
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The IMF should contribute to developing and dealing with oversight agencies independent of the 
government, such as politicians, parliaments, and civil society organizations interested in 
development and research centers in these countries. 
The International Monetary Fund calls on governments in low-income countries to have more 
transparency in the management of public funds, and mechanisms must be put in place to enable 
them to monitor and follow up loans to these countries because most of them are looted. At least 
senior officials in my country. 
The International Monetary Fund should not depend in designing its policies on the indicators and 
economic figures provided to them by the governments of these countries because it is not accurate 
and the government's goal is to satisfy the visiting mission of the International Monetary Fund to 
obtain the next loan. Consequently, the Fund must develop new mechanisms to obtain accurate 
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